

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**EXPLORING CULTURAL PREDICTORS OF MILITARY  
INTERVENTION SUCCESS**

by

Dr. Earl G. Wade, Department of the Air Force

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements for the Degree of

**MASTER OF OPERATIONAL ARTS AND SCIENCES**

Advisor: Dr. Angelle M. Khachadorian

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2015

### **Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.



## **Abstract**

The following paper describes an ex post facto exploration of predictors of military intervention success. As such, the research examined pre- and post-intervention political conditions as a measure of democratization in countries subject to UN peacekeeping missions. To determine political conditions of democratization in countries subject to UN intervention, the research referred to the Polity IV Project's database of "Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013." The study measured the difference in each country pre- and post-intervention average polity score and corrected this statistic for UN per capita cost and identified countries that significantly outperformed (and underperformed) the group average. These countries were subjected to further qualitative analysis to identify cultural factors that might predict intervention success. The study concluded that Central American former Spanish colonies with large "mestizo" populations and a longer history of independence tended to outperform other UN interventions. The study also determined that while ethnic fractionalization was a predictor of pre-intervention low polity scores, it was not related to performance (change in average polity score) in the study.

## Contents

Disclaimer .....	ii
Abstract .....	iii
Introduction.....	1
The United Nations .....	2
Literature.....	5
Method .....	7
Quantitative Analysis.....	8
Qualitative Analysis.....	11
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations.....	12
Results.....	13
Quantitative Analysis.....	14
Qualitative Analyses .....	16
Guatemala .....	16
Nicaragua .....	20
Cambodia .....	22
Central African Republic .....	24
East Timor (Timor-Leste) .....	27
Discussion .....	30
Conclusion .....	32
Recommendations .....	34
Appendix.....	37
Bibliography .....	41

## Illustrations

Figure 1. Change in Average Polity 1979-2013 .....	5
Figure 2. Uncorrected Average and Range of Pre- and Post-Polity Scores.....	16



## Tables

Table 1. Correlation Categories for Pearson's $r$ , Critical $t$ , and Probability .....	10
Table 2. Pre- and Post-Polity Score Max, Min, Deviation, and Average .....	37
Table 3. Polity Scores Analysis of UN Interventions .....	38
Table 4. Correlation of Alesina and Fearon's Fractionalization.....	39
Table 5. Country and Intervention Data .....	40



## *Introduction*

Military interventions in weak and failing states have become increasingly common since the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>1</sup> These interventions typically involve military forces to provide relief during a natural disaster, civil war or insurgency/terrorism. Often, there is no clear objective beyond some liberalist-inspired notion to “advance democracy and human rights.”<sup>2</sup> Unlike traditional warfare, where territory can be aggressively taken and defended from an enemy, progress is difficult to measure; insurgencies and civil wars are often amorphous ebbing and flowing affairs with intervention forces trapped in the midst of the chaos.<sup>3</sup> Such warfare is often characterized as a battle for the “hearts and minds;” an endeavor obviously fraught with even more difficulty of measurement. As smaller, militarily weaker Third-World nations see irregular warfare as a viable strategy for opposing global commerce and policies of First-World nations, the United States can expect to be faced with decisions to intervene in internal conflicts and humanitarian affairs of smaller nations.<sup>4</sup>

A probability analysis of successful outcomes provides important information to balance the cost-versus-benefit in an analysis of compelling national interests. This research provides just such an analysis in the limited scope of United Nations (UN) interventions over the past few decades. This research seeks to identify predictive cultural factors of intervention success through an ex post facto, mixed method analysis of UN interventions.

Given the increasing popularity of the military intervention and the difficulty of measuring success, it is important to develop a system whereby progress toward a specific goal can be definitively measured; by reviewing past military interventions through such a lens, cost-versus-benefit can be assessed in both past and future interventions. The object of the research is thus to assess the effectiveness of interventions in achieving the intervening organization’s (e.g.

nation, coalition, alliance) goals. To this end, the research asks the question, “Do cultural factors exist that can predict the future success of an intervention?”

The importance of this question lies not only in its application to UN interventions but to the broader category of all military endeavors. Military theorists are often seen to struggle in their prediction of the effect of a particular military action. For example: Mitchell and Douhet posit that strategic bombing will force a nation to surrender quickly; unfortunately, extensive strategic bombing failed to produce the desired result. This struggle to predict from one’s theory may be the result of an overlooked confounding variable: culture.

Culture is a significant factor in the analysis of an opponent’s reaction and thus in the prediction of military outcomes. This is because war (in this context) is typically conducted against people, and people have culture that informs their decision-making processes. This cultural effect is found in the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment: “Sociocultural analysis improves the JFC’s ability to understand, predict, respond to and/or influence the decision making and associated behavior of relevant actors.”<sup>5</sup> It is also found in the stages of Boyd’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act.<sup>6</sup> Culture thus permeates the opponent’s will to act and may be its own center of gravity.

### The United Nations

In its “History of Peacekeeping,” the UN literature notes, “Since 1948, UN peacekeepers have undertaken 69 field missions, which, among many other things, enabled people in dozens of countries to participate in free and fair elections...”<sup>7</sup> This idea of free and fair elections appears throughout UN literature on the subject of peacekeeping. It consequently seems that UN



peacekeeping goes beyond merely monitoring hostilities between opposing parties to a level of reordering society within a target country to a more democratic ideal.

In its current “Peacekeeping Capstone Doctrine,” the UN espouses a list of general objectives for the intervention-target nation: “...support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of law.”<sup>8</sup> While the UN may intervene in a particular conflict in a particular country to keep opposing military forces apart, peacekeeping also involves an element of political, social and juridical reform. In addition, the UN has, over the years, published a series of resolutions reaffirming the organizations desire to promote democratization on a global basis. These documents refer to a vision of, “Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization.”<sup>9</sup> In sum, the UN engages in the promotion of western-style democracy complete with human rights and equal treatment under the law. Given this vision and objective, UN interventions are markedly useful for study as they all have this same, normative vision. Unlike other interventions (for less-altruistic purposes), UN interventions are uniform in their objective, the promotion of a democratic polity (i.e. a democratic form of government).

In addition to the UN Capstone Doctrine, each UN intervention is initiated by, and proceeds upon its mission based on specific objectives outlined in a UN Security Council Resolution approved for each particular intervention. The resolution generally, however not always, follows the precepts outlined in the Capstone Doctrine, mandates specific political and social objectives and provides a legal basis for the intervention. Some intervention mandates did not follow the political/social/humanitarian formula of the Capstone since they were directed for specific apolitical purposes such as monitoring borders between opposing groups or nations. In

one case, an intervention was abandoned after approximately 30 days when circumstances in a neighboring country obviated the intervention.

UN interventions do exhibit characteristic differences from most single-nation or small coalitions of militarily-capable nations. UN interventions occur only at the invitation of a country requesting UN assistance and, in accordance with the Capstone Doctrine's mandate, cannot force a particular political method or economic theory upon the target country.<sup>10</sup> UN forces are consequently ill-equipped for offensive combat operations. Larger UN interventions are often composed of upwards of a dozen nations' troop contributions. Unlike an armored, airborne or amphibious assault force typical in a US intervention, the UN force is neither manned nor equipped for intense continuous combat operations. Instead, UN peacekeeping forces have no military objectives and are constrained from using force except in self-defense or defense of the mandate.<sup>11</sup>

In spite of these force limitations, UN interventions do seem to a certain extent, successful. On average, all countries worldwide are slowly moving toward a democratic polity. When UN interventions were compared to all countries, the countries experiencing a UN intervention are moving toward a democratic polity faster than all other countries (see Figure 1). Based on standard testing methods, this accelerated pace ( $m = .21$  versus  $m = .29$ ) is statistically significant ( $t = 4.16$ ;  $P < .001$ ). This is the vision espoused by the Capstone Doctrine: to assist a population by accelerating their progress toward democracy, free market economy, equal treatment under the law and respect for human rights. Pape noted that an individual's attachment to national goals was intensified by democratization: "With a greater sense of participation in the affairs of government, the more citizens see the state as the embodiment of higher values and the deeper their commitment to protect and support the state and its goals."<sup>12</sup>




Figure 1. Change in Average Polity 1979-2013

### *Literature*

Unlike the UN's relatively optimistic vision for intervention, some authors are much more pessimistic concerning the efficacy of intervention by any organization or nation. In these cases, authors often refer to a need for a "grass-roots" consensus among disputing parties within the target nation. Mazarr concluded external efforts to build new cultures in failed states (state building) were useless. Instead, developmental change had to come from within the culture as well as proceed in a way, and at a pace acceptable to that culture. Mazarr also espoused a negative view of intervention, seeing it as not only ineffective, but draining resources from more important national objectives.<sup>13</sup> Mazarr consequently speaks to the significance of this research: if the probability of success can be refined, return on investment increases.

Alternatively, Walzer believed that once intervening forces have brought a military threat under control, that force as well as allies and any remaining local authority is naturally responsible for political reconstruction.<sup>14</sup> Walzer further opined that intervention often occasioned the need for forcible democratization; traditional social structure might have to be dismantled or altered to clear a path to democracy.<sup>15</sup> Walzer compared and contrasted interventions in Iraq, Rwanda, Germany and Japan to illustrate his point. On the one hand, the existing German political structure was completely dismantled allow for the local creation of some form of constitutional democracy. Alternatively, cases like Iraq and Rwanda attempted to control existing normative social behavior without preceding, violent dismemberment of the existing social and political infrastructure.

To be sure, Walzer debated the idea of when a nation was justified in intervention specifically for regime change (based on the intervener's disagreement with the current socio-political policy of the target nation). In this light, Walzer saw a difference between the World War II conflicts, and subsequent reconstruction of Germany and Japan, and the later interventions of the post-cold-war era. In the former cases, regime change was an outgrowth or logical consequence of the military defeat. In the later cases, intervention was strictly a matter of altering the policy of the target regime.<sup>16</sup> Walzer nonetheless provided a well-thought-out argument against intervention in the absence of compelling national interest (direct military threat) common in the pre-cold-war era. Walzer emphasized Mill's idea that an oppressed people must free itself from tyranny; it cannot be done for them through foreign intervention. Walzer also found that for moral or prudential reasons, the decision to intervene can go either way, based on a general expediency.<sup>17</sup>

In discussing foreign aid investment as a preventative measure for weak and failing states, DiPrizio summarized the problem: “In short, if American policymakers are going to take the threat of weak and failing states seriously, they are going to have to find better ways of racking and stacking the list of fragile states to more rationally focus the nation’s limited resources.”<sup>18</sup> DiPrizio also noted that public support for such efforts was problematic because, “proving that aid is efficacious is difficult at best.”<sup>19</sup>

The UN, perhaps through the perceived legitimacy of a global consensus, finds intervention by its member-states an effective means of altering the policy of the target nation toward a more democratic outcome. The UN thus presents the primary argument for effective intervention to control political outcomes in target nations. In this context of UN interventions, this research sought out answers to DiPrizio’s questions of efficacy and priority in focusing an organization’s intervention efforts.

### *Method*

It is important to note this study does not attempt to justify intervention. Instead, the study attempts to measure the effectiveness of an intervention in terms of progress toward democracy and quantify a benefit useful in pre-intervention decision-making. The study of UN interventions is an expedient; it is easier to compare one intervention to another when the input conditions of reasons, planning and implementation of the interventions are standardized.

This research employed a sequential, mixed method analysis consisting of a quantitative ex post facto analysis of United Nation’s (UN) interventions followed by a qualitative analysis of the most and least successful interventions. Although many countries, coalitions, and alliance intervene in other countries affairs, this study focuses exclusively on UN interventions. UN

interventions were selected for this study because they are more standardized in both their process of planning, supporting and implementing the intervention, as well as their reasons for, and objectives of intervention.

### Quantitative Analysis

Thirty potential subject interventions were identified in Kisangani and Pickering's International Military Intervention (IMI) database<sup>20</sup> and recorded by country code, country, name and UN operation name. All UN interventions in the database (1989-2005) were selected for this study. As such, they are considered the entire population and not treated as samples for calculation. The IMI database also provided intervention start- and end-dates as well as troop strengths and reason for intervention.

With subject interventions identified, the research turned to the Polity IV Project's database of "Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013,"<sup>21</sup> to examine changes in the political characterization of each intervention target-country. The ongoing Polity Project measures and records each country on an autocracy-democracy scale annually since 1800 (where data is available). The Polity databases assesses political factors of:

1. Openness (who can become the chief executive),
2. Participation (who selects the executive) and
3. Constraints on the executive (e.g. an equally powerful legislative branch, constitution, etc.).

These factors are combined into a numerical score from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). To facilitate calculations in this research, this scale was modified to 0 (most autocratic) to 20 (most democratic).

At this point, interventions were culled for instances of lack of sufficient data, or in some cases, ambiguous data across the pre- and post-intervention periods. In some of these discarded interventions, the Polity IV database failed to record a polity score over multiple years, in others, the polity score had been replaced by an error code. In other cases, the specific mandate for the intervention did not include specific language relating to establishment of a democratic political system in the target country. In all, 15 interventions were discarded.

Using the data from both the Polity IV and IMI databases, the research evaluated the annual Polity score in each intervention target country during an 11-year period prior to the intervention and a ten-year period after the intervention. 11-year periods were chosen because the final UN intervention in the IMI database occurred in 2004, thus allowing for a maximum of 11 years of post-intervention data (by 2015). Each 11-year period was assessed for maximum and minimum score, standard deviation, and average Polity score (see Appendix, Table 2). Movement on the Polity scale (changes in descriptive data from pre- to post-intervention periods) was recorded. Changes in polity score were correlated (using Excel “CORREL”) to both Fearon and Alesina et al.’s cultural, linguistic and ethnic and fractionalization indices. Throughout the study, reference is made to “weak,” “moderate,” or “strong” correlation between factors. Correlations were assessed in these categories based on standard t-tests comparing a null hypothesis of  $r = 0$  to a calculated  $r$  on a t-distribution when  $N = 15$ . Critical values of  $r$ ,  $t$ , and their attendant probabilities are shown in Table 1.

Correlation	r (+/-)	t (critical)	P
Very Strong	$r > .64$	3.011	0.01
Strong	.52 to .63	2.195	0.05
Moderate	.44 to .52	1.767	0.1
Weak	.32 to .43	1.218	0.25
None	$r < .31$	NA	NA

Table 1. Correlation Categories for Pearson's r, Critical t, and Probability

No reportable correlation was detected between polity displacement and Alesina et al.'s fractionalization indices ( $.09 < r < .18$ ). Although seemingly redundant, Fearon's fractionalization index was added to the analysis as a cross-check of Alesina et al.'s index since the latter was the subject of some criticism by the former. Fearon's index of ethnic fractionalization had a very strong positive relationship to Alesina et al.'s of ethnic and linguistic indices ( $r = .92$  and  $.81$ , respectively). A lesser, moderate relationship ( $r = .45$ ) was detected between Fearon's ethnic and Alesina et al.'s religious fractionalization indices (see Appendix Table 4). This research relied predominately on Alesina et al.'s index of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization. Fractionalization was included in the quantitative portion of this research based on Alesina et al.'s discussion of ethnic fractionalization's effect on the quality of government and its institutions.<sup>22</sup>

To account for the amount of UN effort versus the size of the target country, displacement on the polity scale was corrected using a ratio of displacement/per capita cost. In calculating per capita costs, the total UN expenditure was annualized and corrected to year 2000 World Currency Units (also known as Geary-Khamis Dollars). UN 2005 population estimates were used to complete the calculation (see Appendix Table 5). Throughout this study,



“Corrected” displacement on the average polity scale is referred to when the author wishes to compare two interventions. “Uncorrected” displacement is used when referring to the effect of an intervention in a particular country. In other words, it is necessary to correct for UN effort in an individual country when comparing countries in the study. Correction for UN effort is not necessary when speaking of the benefit (or lack thereof) of a particular intervention. Correlations between Alesina et al.’s indices and changes in average polity score, as well as correction data, are presented in Table 3 (see Appendix).

Each target country was ranked based on the movement from its pre-intervention average polity score to its post-intervention polity score. A z-test was performed to determine the probability of achieving a particular displacement-score within the group and facilitate comparison between countries. Top and bottom deciles were determined for later comparison in the qualitative portion of the study.

### Qualitative Analysis

Intervention target-countries demonstrating the greatest and least displacement on the polity scale (zero- and .90-decile) were subjected to the subsequent qualitative analysis. This qualitative analysis involved a brief description of the country including geopolitical, demographic and political factors. Each qualitative analysis was conducted by reviewing information in:

1. The Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook,
2. The UN database of Past Peacekeeping Missions,
3. The Encyclopedia Britannica, and
4. Cornell and Kalt’s model of extra-constitutional agreement and constitutional match

This analysis assessed the target-country's cultural factors for suitability to movement toward democracy. In particular, the research focused on Cornell and Kalt's ideas of the structure, scope, source, and location of authority and attempted to determine this suitability based on historical political and cultural factors.<sup>23</sup> The research thus sought out concepts of ethnic and religious homogeneity and accustomed political structure (e.g. monarchy, tribal leadership, etc.).

East Timor was kept in the qualitative portion of the study in spite of its lack of pre-intervention polity data required for the quantitative portion. As a new nation, East Timor declared its independence in 1975 but was almost immediately occupied by Indonesia. This occupation lasted some 20 years and was followed by a civil war between pro- and anti-independence factions until 2002, after the UN intervention. East Timor consequently had no pre-intervention data; East Timor was significant to the study, however, due to the rather large per capita UN appropriation for the mission. Even allowing for maximum displacement on the average polity scale, the cost of the intervention overwhelmed polity displacement; the corrected polity displacement could not be shifted from near-zero (East Timor made no significant progress).

#### Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations

The research assumes data in the IMI and Polity IV databases are correct and free from administrative error. The research further assumes extraneous influences of weather, logistics, and infrastructure are accounted for in the UN planning and execution of the intervention (i.e. special allowances for extreme circumstances). The research also assumes interventions are for the UN's stated purposes of improving, increasing or furthering democratization and free-market

economies in the target-country and good faith efforts in that regard are made on the part of international troop assigned for that purpose.

The research is delimited to interventions included in Kisangani and Pickering's IMI database and further delimited to UN interventions for the previously addressed reasons. The research is thus limited in terms of generalization as it does not draw a random sample of interventions from a larger population. Since the research relies on a population of UN interventions for coherence, it may be best viewed as a trend-analysis to predict future success in similar UN-type interventions. Readers are invited to draw their own conclusions in light of the ex post facto, exploratory nature of the research.

### *Results*

In spite of the many assumptions and limitation forced upon the research by its ex post facto design, it nonetheless provided some interesting insights. Chief among these insights was the popular notion that ethnic and religious fractionalization complicates, and makes mission accomplishment more difficult; this appeared not to be the case in the data studied here. Ethnic, religious and linguistic fractionalization had no impact on the outcome of an intervention and was not related to displacement on the polity scale overall. While Alesina et al.'s indices of fractionalization had some relationship (i.e.  $-.45 < r < -.32$ ) with pre-intervention average, maximum, and minimum polity scores, fractionalization bore little relationship to *displacement* along the polity scale. For the country in question however, it is important to note that ethnic and religious fractionalization had a moderate and strong negative correlation ( $r = -.46$  and  $-.58$ , respectively) to minimum pre-intervention polity score. Ethnic fractionalization had an attendant moderate negative correlation to the pre-intervention average polity score ( $r = -.45$ ).

Fractionalization was thus an indicator of *where* a country *started* on the scale; this negative

effect of fractionalization in the pre-intervention period may have driven the UN decisions to intervene in the subject countries.

### Quantitative Analysis

Of the 15 countries remaining in the final analysis, displacement on the average polity score scale was +5.73, and 5 of the 15 had a z-score greater than .90. When corrected for per capita cost, however, average polity score was only displaced 2.00, and only two countries achieved a z-score in excess of .90.

Guatemala and Nicaragua experienced the greatest positive displacement in average corrected polity score at 10.54 and 8.95 respectively. Guatemala started at a pre-intervention average polity score (uncorrected) of 7.09 and ended with a post-intervention score of 15.27, covering 8.18 points (41%) on a 20-point scale. Similarly, Nicaragua improved its polity score from 7.45 to 17.09; like Guatemala, this constituted a greater than 100% increase in average uncorrected polity score. Conversely, Cambodia and the Central African Republic experienced the least displacement in average corrected polity score at .01 and .06, respectively. In keeping with the research plan, these nations were selected for further study in the qualitative portion of the analysis. Of note, the UN expended \$0.78 and \$1.08 per capita in Guatemala and Nicaragua respectively; the UN expended approximately 40 times that amount in each of the interventions in Cambodia and the Central African Republic.

In spite of some authors in the literature review opining negatively on the efficacy of future interventions, it must be noted that (at least in the case of the data studied herein) UN interventions in general had a positive effect on the polity scores of the target country. Average

uncorrected displacement on the polity scale was a positive 5.73 toward democracy (approximately 20% of the IMI 20-point scale). Of the 15 countries in the study, no target countries moved down (negative average polity displacement) the polity scale toward autocracy. In some cases, the intervention, while not achieving the desired shift in average polity score, preceded a post-intervention period characterized by reduced variation in polity score compared to the pre-intervention period. In 10 out of 15 interventions, the standard deviations of polity scores were lower in the post-intervention period by at least one point. Three of four experienced reduced standard deviation. Guatemala and Nicaragua benefitted from greater reduction than the Central African Republic in this regard while Cambodia's standard deviation was dramatically higher in the post-intervention period. Overall, it can be stated that, in the data included in this study, UN interventions were largely successful in the sense that 27% of UN interventions preceded a greater than average increase in corrected average polity score, while the remainder experienced a lesser, but still positive displacement of corrected average polity score.

The quantitative portion of the study concluded there was no significant relationship between ethnic, linguistic, or religious fractionalization and average polity score displacement. Further, there is no significant relationship (although a weak positive correlation is present) between average polity displacement and per capita UN appropriation. The quantitative analysis did however, reveal a significant difference (given the average corrected polity change of 2.0,  $P < .001$ ) between the results of intervention in Guatemala and Nicaragua versus Cambodia and the Central African Republic as shown in Figure 2. The research consequently moved on to a qualitative analysis of the countries identified in the preceding quantitative analysis.




Figure 2. Uncorrected Average and Range of Pre- and Post-Polity Scores

### Qualitative Analyses<sup>24</sup>

#### *Guatemala*

Guatemala first enters the historical description as part of the Mayan Empire of Central America. The classical Mayan period ended approximately 900 AD, ostensibly due to large-scale drought and disruption of the agricultural economy upon which the Mayan civilization was based. A series of smaller kingdoms continued on after the Maya, transmitting much of the

Mayan culture on to modern-day nation-descendants such as Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

This continuation of Mayan culture was disrupted by the arrival of Spanish expeditions starting in 1519. In this era, Guatemala had some autonomy as an *Audencia*, part of New Spain (Mexico) but was still part of the Spanish Empire in the New World. As far as Spanish colonies went, Guatemala was not particularly prosperous in comparison to the mineral resources of places like Mexico or Peru. Instead, Guatemala's importance to the Spanish Empire lay in its geographic and political significance. Guatemala City became the Spanish seat-of-government for the Central American region that would include Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Nicaragua. This importance to Spain continued until 1821 when Guatemala (and New Spain in general) gained its independence.

From 1821 until the UN intervention of 1989, Guatemala was ruled through a series of committees, dictators, and revolutions various supported (or not supported by the United States). By 1982, a military junta led by General Efraín Ríos Montt was in control of Guatemala; in 1986 Montt was overthrown by Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores, who instituted a limited constitutional government in Guatemala. At the time of the intervention, four resistance or revolutionary groups operated inside Guatemala; some were supported by neighboring Nicaraguan and El Salvadoran insurgent groups. A civil war between these groups and the central Guatemalan government officially ended in 1996 through a UN-brokered peace agreement.

Today, Guatemala is considered a constitutional democratic republic. Led by a president who combines the functions of head of state and head of government, Guatemala's constitution provides for separation of powers between the executive head of state, a legislative congress and

an independent judicial branch. Both the head of state and representatives to legislative bodies are chosen through a multi-party political system.

Guatemala's population consists of 58% European or European (Mestizo) descent, 40% Indian and 2% *Garifuna*, descended from African intermarriage with indigenous peoples. Among these peoples, Spanish is the official language and spoken as either a first or second language by 93% of the population. Indigenous peoples, however, maintain 21 Mayan languages and a further two Indian languages. The Garifuna have a separate language. While there is some diversity, Guatemala, as a larger culture, has the advantage of some ethnic and linguistic homogeneity.

A syncretic version of Roman Catholicism enculturating various Mayan religious practices is observed by 60% of the population with a small, but growing, percentage (approximately 1%) Eastern Orthodox. A remaining, approximately 40%, of the population ascribes to various protestant denominations. Guatemala is also home to small communities of Jews, Muslims, and Buddhists. Most of the above adherents continue to observe separate traditional Mayan practices.

In addition to the above divisions along ethnic and religious lines, Guatemalans are somewhat segregated in daily life. A stark contrast exists between urban populations with their access to modern technological lifestyles indistinguishable from first-world city life and more traditional lifestyles just outside the city limits. Once beyond the city, traditional garments become more prevalent and daily economic life is centered on the town market and the exchange of produce and cottage manufactures as opposed to the western garb, salaried job and the supermarket of the city.



Internationally, Guatemala is rated 122 out of 182 on the United Nations Human Development Index and 80 out of 133 on the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report. For comparison, the United States is rated number 5 and number 3 on the Human Development and Competitiveness scales, respectively.

The UN intervention in Guatemala was part of a larger effort officially known as the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). As such, it was involved in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua as well as Guatemala. For this study, the UN budget for ONUCA was divided by five to represent the budget for each country in the intervention. The overall budget was so small however, that regardless of how the budget is divided, ONUCA was a very cost-efficient intervention. From pre- to post-intervention the UN effort in Guatemala coincided with an average polity score displacement of 8.18. When corrected for annual per capita cost, the displacement was 10.54; the correction included a budget amount for a 1997 verification mission resulting in a total annual budget for Guatemala of \$9.8M. Guatemala was thus the most effective and efficient UN intervention in this study.

The intervention began in 1989 with Security Council resolution 644 to enforce the Esquipulas II Agreement. This agreement, aimed at preventing the nations of Central America from supporting rebel groups in their neighbors' territories, also called for free elections, democracy, and general development of political and economic infrastructure. In their quest to enforce the provisions of Esquipulas II, UN peacekeeping forces managed to demobilize and disarm numerous insurgent groups through Central America and bring them to negotiations in their respective countries. With the exception of El Salvador, which warranted a separate, longer-lasting intervention, ONUCA was largely successful in reducing the violence and democratizing a large portion of Central America.

With the insurgencies and cross-border support for them under control, the ONUCA intervention force turned its attention to internal matters and objectives of the agreement. By 1992, the UN Secretary General ended ONUCA and transferred the peacekeeping force into El Salvador to continue to support that country in its ongoing efforts to enforce the Esquipulas II Agreement.

### *Nicaragua*

Like Guatemala, Nicaragua belonged to a “Mesoamerican Linguistic Area” and was possessed of a Mayan cultural civilization. While this culture predominated in the western parts of Nicaragua, a Caribbean-cultural group inhabited the eastern coastal regions on the Gulf of Mexico. Also like Guatemala, Nicaragua became part of the Spanish Empire in the New World in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and remained so until it gained its independence in 1821. When the Audiencia of Guatemala disintegrated in 1821, Nicaragua was part of a short-lived union with Mexico, from which it eventually seceded in 1838.

Since Nicaragua had endured American and European interference since its inception, Augusto Cesar Sandino began a general revolution in 1927 lasting until 1933. This revolution resulted in a cease-fire between Sandino and the newly installed Somoza government, which reigned until 1979. During later this period, Sandinistas (philosophical descendants of Sandino) waged a revolutionary war against the Somoza regime, eventually taking control in 1979. The Sandinistas were in turn opposed by the Contras who were supported by the United States in retaliation for Sandinista support of El Salvadoran rebels.

As mentioned above, the 1989 UN intervention in Nicaragua occurred as part of a larger intervention into the morass of Central American revolutions and local cross-border support for

revolutions in neighboring countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua). Subsequent to this intervention, Nicaragua was characterized (like Guatemala) as a democratic republic with a presidential office encompassing head of state, government, and a multi-party political system. An independent National Assembly provides legislative functions, and a judicial branch exists independent of both the executive and legislative branches.

Nicaraguan demographics are somewhat similar to that of Guatemala in the sense that a dominant Mestizo-European group exist alongside minority ethnic groups; this European/Mestizo dominance is, however, more striking in Nicaragua. European and Mestizo Nicaraguans account for 86% of the population.

Much like Guatemala's city-country divide, Nicaragua appears to be divided between East- and West-Coast. Political dissent from West-Coast revolutionary movements resulted in civil war for much of the nation's history. This political trend may have arisen from ethnic- and linguistic trends separating the western and eastern populations. On the east coast, Nicaraguans speak English and a creole version of English as a first language (Spanish is spoken as a fluent, second language). Alternatively, in the western parts of Nicaragua, Spanish predominates along with various indigenous languages (Miskito, Sumo, and Rama) and sub-dialects. The Garifuna Afro-Caribbean language found in Guatemala extends to Nicaragua.

In keeping with its Central American location with Guatemala, Nicaragua illustrates a similar religious demographic. The vast majority of the country subscribes to Roman Catholicism although a burgeoning Protestant minority is gaining an increasing constituency, particularly among the Moravian and Latter Day Saints protestant denominations. Nicaragua is also home to a small Buddhist population, driven by immigration from East Asia.

As part of a broader UN intervention into Central America described above in Guatemala, the UN mission into Nicaragua was equally successful. The UN intervention was followed by a 9.64-point displacement in the average polity score 9.64, from +7.45 to +17.09. When corrected for population and UN costs this displacement came to 8.64, making Nicaragua the second-best performing country for corrected polity displacement in this study.

The results in Nicaragua and Guatemala, although not representative of all Central American countries, exhibited a clear break from other countries in this study. While other countries' corrected polity displacement ranged from .01 to 2.99, Guatemala and Nicaragua exhibited corrected polity displacements of 10.54 and 8.95, respectively, indicating very little per capita UN investment coincided with rather large displacements in some Central American countries.

### *Cambodia*

Cambodia is the cultural heir and remnant of the 10<sup>th</sup> to 13<sup>th</sup> century Angkor Empire that dominated Southeast Asia. This Empire eventually disintegrated in the face of incursions by Thai and (what would become) Vietnamese peoples. After a long decline, Cambodia voluntarily became a French protectorate in 1863 and part of French Indochina in 1887. After the World War II occupation by Japan, Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953. By 1975 however, after a five-year insurgency, Cambodia fell to the communist Khmer Rouge. After a brutal reign resulting in almost 1.5 million deaths, the Khmer Rouge were overthrown during a 1978 Vietnamese invasion and a further 13-year civil war. A 1991 Paris Peace Accord did not completely end the fighting although a 1993 UN-supervised election resulted in some stability and a coalition government. A return to inter-factional fighting ended this coalition in 1997; a

1998 vote resulted in another coalition government and a return to some semblance of political stability. The last units of Khmer Rouge resistance surrendered in 1999.

Cambodia (officially the “Kingdom of Cambodia”) is a multi-party democracy in a constitutional monarchy made up of 23 administrative districts and one municipality (the capital, Phnom Penh). As such, the king is chosen from among eligible males of the royal family. After a series of elections in the 23 districts chooses representative to the National Assembly (lower house). A senate (upper house) is selected by appointment of the monarch, election by the National Assembly and a further popular vote.

As its highest courts, an independent judicial branch includes a Supreme Court (an ultimate appellate court) and a Constitutional court (dealing with normative constitutional questions). Subordinate appellate, provincial and municipal courts exist throughout Cambodia.

The Khmer are the largest ethnic group (90%) followed by the Vietnamese (5%) and Chinese (1%). The Library of Congress Country Study, however, describes the population as 80% Khmer and the remainder a mix of “Chinese, Vietnamese, Cham, Khmer Loeu (Highland Khmer), Europeans.” Repatriation of some Vietnamese in the early 1970s, coupled with emigration of large numbers of Cham and Chinese, brought the Khmer percentage (including the Khmer Loeu to 90%. In a similar fashion, Khmer is the dominant (and official) language. 96.3% of Cambodians speak Khmer. Buddhism is the official religion of Cambodia with adherents among 96.9% of the population. Muslims and Christians account for a further 2.3%.

The UN intervention began in October 1991 with the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) which lasted six months before turnover to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in March of 1992. While UNAMIC was devoted to initially securing the

territory and subsequent minesweeping operations, UNTAC (Security Council Resolution 745) was more politically and socially oriented. UNTAC's mandate included efforts to improve human rights, conduct elections, establish civil administrative infrastructure, establish law and order, and provide for repatriation of refugees. UNTAC's mandate lasted until September 1993.

Much like the UN's East Timor intervention, the Cambodian effort was singularly unsuccessful in this study. Cambodia's uncorrected average polity score remained unchanged (only displacing .64 points from 10.09 to 10.73). At an annual cost of \$606M for a much larger population than that of East Timor (14 million) however, the corrected average polity change was only .01, not significantly different from that of East Timor. UNAMIC/UNTAC was less costly per-capita than the East Timorese intervention but seemed to have had just as little effect in terms of average polity score.

#### *Central African Republic*

Formerly a French colony, The Central African Republic gained its independence in 1960. Between 1960 and the early 1990s, the country experienced a series of military governments before a civilian leader, Angel-Felix Patasse was able to gain control of the government in 1993. This civilian authority was deposed in another military coup in 2003 by General Francois Bozize. Bozize was re-elected in 2005 and 2011 elections widely seen as fraudulent. At the same time, rebel groups controlled large portions of the countryside. A coalition government composed of several rebel groups' leadership drove Bozize from the country and Michael Djotodia, a rebel leader, was chosen as president.

At the time of the UN intervention (1998), the Central African Republic was under the civilian rule of Patasse, but in increasing unstable circumstances. Officially known as the UN

Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), the intervention was initiated by Security Council Resolution 1159 with a mandate to, among other objectives, “provide advice and technical support to the national electoral bodies regarding the electoral code and plans for the conduct of legislative elections.” MINURCA began following three military mutinies driven by extensive failure of the government to pay salaries and widespread discontent with political, social, and economic conditions throughout the country. A coalition of forces from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon and Mali (with logistic and financial support of France) deployed 800 personnel to the Central African Republic in an attempt to restore order. The UN approved the above intervention (later reinforced by Senegal and Togo) in resolution 1125 in 1997. By 1998 however, it was clear the stability-objectives of the intervention were beyond the capacities of the African nations of the coalition; the UN intervention began in early 1998.

In 2000, the intervention ended with a report from the Secretary-General noting the presence of UN peacekeeping forces had provided sufficient stability to allow elections to proceed as well as the establishment of major social, political and economic reforms. The report also noted the government of the Central African Republic needed to continue to build on the foundational elements established by the UN intervention and exhorted the country’s leadership to continue to strive for democracy and economic reform.

In the development of political reform, the intervention was particularly unsuccessful. The Central African Republic’s displacement on the average polity scale, although positive, was only 2.55 (the average of all countries in the study was +5.73). When this displacement was corrected for per capita cost, the displacement was a comparatively small +.06 (average corrected polity score displacement was + 2.00), the intervention essentially had no effect on the political society of the country. With a pre-intervention average polity score of 8.64 and a post-

intervention score of 11.16, the Central African Republic moved from slightly autocratic to slightly democratic. The country's population of 4 million, and the UN's annual investment of \$164.3M, resulted in an annual per capita cost of \$41 (average per capita cost in this study was \$21).

The Central African Republic's population is comprised of seven main ethnic groups which make up 98% of the total population. Among these seven groups, the Baya and Banda account for 33% and 27%, respectively. French is the official language, and the Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook also lists Sango as the "lingua franca and national language."

According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, the Baya (or Gbaya) migrated from northern Nigeria escaping an Islamic jihad in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. Conquering and assimilating people as they moved, the Baya are actually a conglomeration of conquered tribes (e.g. Bokoto, Kara, Buli, Kaka, and Bwaka) they encountered on their trek to what would ultimately become the Central African Republic. The Baya were routinely beset by slavers from Cameroon during this period; with the onset of the colonial period, the Baya continued to resist French forces in the latter's effort to control the area in the 1920s. During this period, the Baya led a revolt against conscript labor for colonial railroads. The French counterinsurgency campaign decimated the Baya population; this was especially devastating to a loose, somewhat stateless society.

The Baya social structure in this generally stateless society was based on a series of age-groups that represented a cross section of clans and families. Members of each age group were trained in practical and religious knowledge until graduated into the next age group. Clan relationships controlled marriage, ceremonial activities, and exchange with (primarily) Arab traders. Village chiefs decided local disputes and exercised ceremonial authority; war chiefs



were selected when necessary and lost their authority with the end of the crisis for which they were selected. The colonial French used these village chiefs as a comprador staff to direct the agricultural labor of the village and tribe to produce French-introduced coffee and rice. Traditionally reliant on hunting, fishing, and some subsistence farming, the 1930's discovery of diamonds in Central Africa region added another economic resource to the tribe.

Fifty percent of Central Africans profess a syncretic form of Christianity (25% Protestant and 25% Roman Catholic) heavily influenced by animism. A further 15% are Muslim and a remaining 35% practice "indigenous beliefs."

The Central African Republic has had several constitutions in recent history and is currently rewriting their latest version. In spite of the apparent lack of an effective constitution, Central Africa appears to be, as its name implies, a republic. The Chief of State's office is occupied by a president, albeit with a relatively high turnover rate (usually due to military intervention in the political process). Prime ministers are also appointed with an equal frequency. Currently, a single-house Transitional Council acts as the legislative body (normally the "National Assembly") with 105 popularly elected members serving five-year terms. The judicial branch consists of a Supreme Court appointed by the president and a Constitutional Court, composed of two appointees of the president, one chosen by the Speaker of the National Assembly and a further six elected by their peers from among lawyers, judges, and law professors. Interestingly, the Constitutional Court is required to have at least three women on the bench.

*East Timor (Timor-Leste)*

As noted above in the “Method” section, East Timor was retained for the qualitative portion of this study due to the intervention’s unique characteristics among the cases studied. East Timor represents the single highest annual per capita investment by the UN for an intervention in this study. As a consequence, its corrected displacement of average polity score (even assuming it started at zero in the pre-intervention period) was only .02.

Portuguese traders began interaction with the island inhabitants of Timor in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century and by midcentury, had colonized the island. In 1859, a treaty with the Dutch resulted in partition of the island; Portugal ceded the western portion of Timor to the Dutch. After the Japanese occupation of World War II, Portugal once again occupied Timor as a colonial power. In 1975, East Timor declared independence from the remainder of the island but was immediately occupied by Indonesian forces who fought a lengthy and largely unsuccessful counterinsurgency campaign against pro-independence militias. In 1999 during a UN-brokered referendum on independence, the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia. Anti-independence militias immediately began an intense guerilla warfare campaign targeting critical infrastructure of power, water, irrigation, schools, and homes, driving large numbers of East Timorese into Timor as refugees. By September 1999, an Australian peacekeeping force had deployed to Timor, ending the violence. Timor-Leste received international recognition of its independence in 2002.

Ethnically, East Timor has two main populations: Malayo-Polynesian and Papuan. The nation is also home to a small Chinese minority. Two official languages are employed, Tetum (belonging to the largest Malayo-Polynesian ethnic component) and Portuguese. English and Indonesian are also widely spoken. In addition to Tetum, there are approximately 15 additional indigenous languages in use on the island. The vast majority of East Timorese are Roman

Catholic (96.9%), perhaps accounting for their fierce resistance to an occupation by the largely Muslim nation of Indonesia. Protestant Christians and Muslims make up a further 2.2% and .3%, respectively.

The UN had originally placed East Timor on its list of “Non-Self-Governing Territories” as far back as 1960 while it was still controlled by Portugal. When civil war broke out between pro- and anti-independence factions, Portugal abandoned the field in 1974 and Indonesia annexed East Timor 1976. The UN never recognized the Indonesian annexation and demanded Indonesia’s immediate withdrawal. The UN continued however, to mediate between Portugal, Indonesia and the inhabitants of East Timor.

The UN intervention in East Timor, officially known as the UN Transition Assistance to East Timor (UNTAET), began in October 1999 and lasted until May of 2002. The intervention force was made up of 6,300 troops from 30 countries and 1,200 civilian police from 39 countries, along with 118 military observers and a further 737 international civilian staff at a total cost of \$477M (2002 dollars). By March 2002, the intervention force sustained 17 total casualties. Although UNTAET ended in 2002, it was immediately succeeded by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET) to continue to provide assistance to key political infrastructure essential to political stability in the country.

UNTAET’s mandate was established by UN Security Council resolution 1272 and was fairly typical of other UN intervention mandates and included specific references to objectives of security, law and order, effective administration, development of civil and social services, humanitarian and developmental assistance, and improve the capacity for self-government.

In a sense, the UN was somewhat successful in the above effort; while no polity data existed before the intervention, East Timor achieved an average polity score of 16.56 in the post-intervention period. This score however, came at a cost of \$549M for a relatively small population (less than one million); the UN per capita expenditure was so large, even the largest theoretical movement in average polity (from 0 to 16.56) only resulted in a corrected average polity displacement of .03. Like Cambodia and the Central African Republic, the UN intervention had no effect in light of the large financial investment in the effort.

### *Discussion*

From a business perspective, this research could be described as an examination of return on investment in terms of asset effectiveness. While this is a rather cold-hearted way of looking at interventions, and many interventions seem to be driven by humanitarian needs, it is still important for the UN, or any nation or group of nations to husband its limited resources, using them for the greatest effect. In the absence data or theoretical predictors, political leadership in intervening organizations cannot make effective investment decisions regarding which intervention, or how much investment is affordable.

This research however, explored predictors of intervention success, with an eye toward cultural factors. Changes in average polity, annual per capita investments were corrected for and a reasonable (in this author's mind) time limits were established. That this time limit was reasonable is demonstrated in the performance of the countries in the study: some performed very well while others performed poorly. The study was thus a fair comparison (a suitable range of performance was observed among subject countries) in its effort to identify cultural factors affecting the outcome of intervention. In light of this cultural focus, it appears in this study that

something other than the intervening group's financial wherewithal or internal ethnic or religious or linguistic fractionalization is the predictor of intervention success or failure.

Among other characteristics of the five final countries discussed in this study, one salient difference was detected during the qualitative analysis. While each country was a former European colony, the more "profitable" interventions occurred in those Central American colonies of Spain. While the Dutch held Timor and the French held both the Central African Republic and Cambodia, they did not leave a large, mixed-heritage population behind unlike the dominant mestizo populations of Central America. The CIA World Factbook shows the mestizo and European peoples of Guatemala and Nicaragua comprising 59% and 86% of each population respectively. In comparison, Timor, Cambodia, and the Central African Republic have native-dominated populations, possibly with little cultural connection to the former colonial culture.

While the five final countries in this study illuminated this difference between them, it did not hold true for other Central American countries. Recalling that Honduras and El Salvador were also subject to the same ONUCA intervention, these countries did not demonstrate the significant advancement in polity score. With corrected average displacements of 2.99 and 1.07 Honduras and El Salvador did not keep up with Guatemala and Nicaragua, but neither did they fall into the lower categories of the other countries in the study.

The performance of the Central American countries, in light of their earlier independence, and when compared to the non-Central-American (African, Indonesian, and Southeast Asian) countries may reflect Mill's philosophy of self-determination and the need to develop "the virtues needful for maintaining freedom." The longer experience of independence from the colonial Spain found among Central American countries (in many cases, more than a century), may have allowed them the time to develop Mill's prerequisite for maintaining

freedom. Freeing themselves from colonial rule in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, countries like Nicaragua and Guatemala had in excess of 150 years before (including some United States' interventions), before the UN interventions of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. In this intervening period, Guatemala and Nicaragua may have primed themselves for a successful UN intervention *a la* Mill. Others like Cambodia and the Central African Republic obviously did not have a similar advantage of a long period of independence, perhaps only benefiting from a few decades of independence. In the particular case of East Timor, an especially unsuccessful intervention-investment coincided with independence. One might say East Timor, as an independent nation was born of intervention; such a country obviously did not have time for Mill's development of things "needful." In view of Mill's ideas of self-determination and development, the research returned to the quantitative analysis to assess the correlation between "years of independence" and corrected displacement of average polity score; a strong positive relationship ( $r = .54$ ) was found between the factors. Using the Vassar online calculator, the significance of this correlation coefficient (in terms of probability)  $P = .019$  ( $N = 15$ ). In other words, testing the null hypothesis of  $r = 0$  for significance, this level of correlation coefficient is predicted to occur by a chance in only 1.9% of samples. Consequently, one is confident a strong relationship exists between change in average polity score and a country's years of independence. Although not in the original remit of this study, this correlation merits further study in future research.

### *Conclusion*

While Mazarr pointed out that progress toward polity change must result from a grass-roots effort, it is important to note that the UN intervenes only upon invitation from the target-country. In the case of civil war, this invitation must be made upon agreement of both warring (and at least disputing) factions. Since this is the standard for UN intervention, it would seem

that the cases studied in this research have at least some grass-roots desire to move toward a more democratic polity. To be fair, Mazarr also notes this struggle toward a new polity will be slow and painful, one should not expect immediate results. In answering the research question (Do cultural factors exist that can predict future intervention success?) this study identified at least one factor that might be termed, “history of independence” based on the strong correlation between number of years since independence and change in average corrected polity score.

None of the research, results or discussion above, means that any stable country reviewed here cannot tomorrow be plunged into revolutionary chaos, nor that a country cannot of its own volition, emerge from some similar chaos. While the majority of UN interventions do produce some positive movement toward democracy, these changes appear unrelated to the amount of ethnic, linguistic, or religious fractionalization. While UN interventions are not always efficient in terms of per capita cost, they at least managed to do no harm in terms of average polity displacement. In comparing the best- and worst performers in this study, Guatemala and Nicaragua were more successful in spite of much lower per capita expenditure by the UN and fractionalization equal to, if not worse than, that of Cambodia and East Timor. In these two categories, cost and fractionalization, these four interventions seem to defy conventional wisdom: paying more did not overcome fractionalization.

Although it was somewhat inconclusive in correlating a cultural factor to a change in average polity score, the qualitative case analyses did note a salient difference in dates-of-independence between the top- and bottom-deciles of the countries in this study and went on to identify a strong correlation between those variables. The study also highlighted the further distinctive characteristic of “former Spanish colony” commonality of the high-performing

countries as well as a slight geographic clustering of high performing countries in Central America.

While the above conclusions cannot be generalized from the limited UN interventions in this study to a broader category of all interventions, they are still important in their refutation of a commonly-expressed belief that intervention in highly-fractionalized societies is at best foolhardy and at worst counterproductive. This paper neither advocates for, nor militates against political intervention, UN or otherwise. Instead, while it could not establish critical factors for success, the paper did determine that interventions are, by and large, successful (uncorrected for cost).

In many cases in this study, per capita corrected interventions resulted in no detectable changes in the target country's average polity score. While the UN obviously did not achieve its social and political objectives outlined in its Capstone Doctrine, it may have had some beneficial effect in stopping or reducing internecine violence or at least in protecting vulnerable populations (bearing in mind, UN peacekeeping forces are prohibited from using force to stop violence between groups). It may be that a new understanding is required of just exactly what an intervention can produce. It may be that protection of vulnerable populations in the "responsibility to protect" is the only reasonable objective, and cultural change can only be brought about almost accidentally, or at least in very limited circumstances. These circumstances might be based on some as yet unknown historical, cultural, or geographic factor.

### Recommendations

Given the foregoing analysis and results, this research recommends an expanded study of interventions in Kisangani and Pickering's database from only UN interventions to some broader



category of interventions seeking to move a target country toward democracy. Bearing in mind this study focused exclusively on UN interventions due to their stated mandates to improve democratic conditions in the target country, interventions by other countries and coalitions do not always have such noble objectives. The above inferences are not conclusions of this study, but rather, questions that are raised by it. These questions might be answered by further study using polity and cultural data to correlate change in average polity to chronological displacement from independence or compare former Spanish colonies performance to non-former-Spanish-colonies. Broad cultural variables might be reduced by delimiting future studies to a particular region (e.g. Central America, Sub-Saharan Africa, etc.). More nuanced cultural aspects might be illuminated in a regionally-focused study.

---

<sup>1</sup> Robert DiPrizio, *Weak and Failing States* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press), 1.

<sup>2</sup> President Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 15.

<sup>3</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 7.

<sup>4</sup> DiPrizio, *Weak and Failing States*, 3, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* (Department of Defense, 2014), xviii.

<sup>6</sup> Frans Osinga "The Enemy as a Complex Adaptive System," *Airpower as Strategy: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd*, ed. John Andreas Olsen. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 16.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *UN Peacekeeping Operations Background Note* (United Nations Department of Public Information - DPI/2429/Rev.18 - April 2014), 1.

<sup>8</sup> UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*, (New York: Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training Department of Peacekeeping Operations United Nations Secretariat, 2010), 6.

<sup>9</sup> UN General Assembly, *66/163. Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization*, (New York: United Nations General Assembly, 2012), 1.

<sup>10</sup> UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*, 31.

<sup>11</sup> Department of Peacekeeping Operations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, (New York: United Nations, December 2003) 59.

<sup>12</sup> Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 21-22.

<sup>13</sup> Michael J. Mazarr, "The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm," *Foreign Affairs* 93, no.1 (Jan/Feb 2014).

<sup>14</sup> Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), x.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, xi.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, 89.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, 87.

<sup>18</sup> DiPrizio, *Weak and Failing States*, 17.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*.

---

<sup>20</sup> Emizet F. Kisangani, and Jeffrey Pickering, *International Military Intervention, 1989-2005*, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Data Collection No 21282, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, (2008).

<sup>21</sup> Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers, *Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013*, Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSOCR) Program Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) University of Maryland, 2014.

<sup>22</sup> Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg., "Fractionalization," *Journal of Economic Growth* 8, (2003): 155-156,  
<http://scholar.harvard.edu/alesina/publications?page=3>

<sup>23</sup> Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt, "Where Does Economic Development Really Come From?: Constitutional Rule Among the Contemporary Sioux and Apache," *Economic Inquiry* 62, no. 4 (July 1995): 402-426.

<sup>24</sup> Information recorded in the qualitative analyses presented is compiled from three sources: the CIA World Factbook at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>, the Encyclopedia Britannica at <http://www.britannica.com>, and UN Past Peacekeeping Operations at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml>.



# Appendix

Country	Pre-Intervention				Post-Intervention				Analysis		
	Min	Max	SD	Av	Min	Max	SD	Av	Delta SD	Delta Av	Dlt Av/\$ per cap
El Salvador	4.00	16.00	4.30	12.18	16.00	17.00	0.29	16.91	4.02	4.73	1.07
Guatemala	3.00	13.00	3.92	7.09	13.00	18.00	2.49	15.27	1.43	8.18	10.54
Honduras	9.00	16.00	2.60	13.73	16.00	17.00	0.39	16.18	2.21	2.45	2.99
Nicaragua	2.00	10.00	2.57	7.45	16.00	18.00	1.00	17.09	1.58	9.64	8.95
Angola	3.00	3.00	0.00	3.00	7.00	10.00	1.00	7.91	-1.00	4.91	0.38
Cambodia	10.00	11.00	0.29	10.09	3.00	12.00	2.49	10.73	-2.20	0.64	0.01
Mozambique	2.00	4.00	0.64	2.64	4.00	15.00	3.16	14.00	-2.52	11.36	1.29
Somalia	3.00	10.00	2.01	3.64	10.00	10.00	0.00	10.00	2.01	6.36	0.09
Haiti	1.00	17.00	4.40	3.45	8.00	17.00	4.14	12.64	0.26	9.18	0.59
Liberia	3.00	10.00	2.81	5.45	10.00	13.00	0.88	10.36	1.93	4.91	0.74
Rwanda	3.00	3.00	0.00	3.00	4.00	7.00	1.24	5.09	-1.24	2.09	0.16
Chad	3.00	10.00	2.14	4.64	6.00	8.00	0.57	7.82	1.57	3.18	0.24
Central African Republic	3.00	15.00	5.82	8.64	9.00	15.00	2.89	11.18	2.93	2.55	0.06
Sierra Leone	3.00	14.00	3.54	4.73	10.00	17.00	2.46	14.36	1.08	9.64	0.13
Congo Kinshasa	1.00	10.00	4.10	6.91	10.00	15.00	2.17	13.00	1.93	6.09	2.79

Table 2. Pre- and Post-Polity Score Max, Min, Deviation, and Average

Polity Scores											
Country	Pre-Intervention				Post-Intervention				Analysis		
	Min	Max	SD	Av	Min	Max	SD	Av	Delta SD	Delta Av	Dlt Av/\$ per cap
El Salvador	4.00	16.00	4.30	12.18	16.00	17.00	0.29	16.91	4.02	4.73	1.07
Guatemala	3.00	13.00	3.92	7.09	13.00	18.00	2.49	15.27	1.43	8.18	10.54
Honduras	9.00	16.00	2.60	13.73	16.00	17.00	0.39	16.18	2.21	2.45	2.99
Nicaragua	2.00	10.00	2.57	7.45	16.00	18.00	1.00	17.09	1.58	9.64	8.95
Angola	3.00	3.00	0.00	3.00	7.00	10.00	1.00	7.91	-1.00	4.91	0.38
Cambodia	10.00	11.00	0.29	10.09	3.00	12.00	2.49	10.73	-2.20	0.64	0.01
Mozambique	2.00	4.00	0.64	2.64	4.00	15.00	3.16	14.00	-2.52	11.36	1.29
Somalia	3.00	10.00	2.01	3.64	10.00	10.00	0.00	10.00	2.01	6.36	0.09
Haiti	1.00	17.00	4.40	3.45	8.00	17.00	4.14	12.64	0.26	9.18	0.59
Liberia	3.00	10.00	2.81	5.45	10.00	13.00	0.88	10.36	1.93	4.91	0.74
Rwanda	3.00	3.00	0.00	3.00	4.00	7.00	1.24	5.09	-1.24	2.09	0.16
Chad	3.00	10.00	2.14	4.64	6.00	8.00	0.57	7.82	1.57	3.18	0.24
Central African Republic	3.00	15.00	5.82	8.64	9.00	15.00	2.89	11.18	2.93	2.55	0.06
Sierra Leone	3.00	14.00	3.54	4.73	10.00	17.00	2.46	14.36	1.08	9.64	0.13
Congo Kinshasa	1.00	10.00	4.10	6.91	10.00	15.00	2.17	13.00	1.93	6.09	2.79

Table 3. Polity Scores Analysis of UN Interventions

Correlation of Polity Scores to Fractionalization											
Fractionalization Index	Pre-Intervention				Post-Intervention				Analysis		
	Min	Max	SD	Av	Min	Max	SD	Av	Delta SD	Delta Av	Dlt Av/\$ per cap
Fearon Ethnic	-0.45	-0.31	0.09	-0.42	-0.15	-0.20	-0.08	-0.21	0.13	0.22	-0.14
Fearon Diversity	-0.22	0.07	0.34	-0.09	-0.01	-0.06	-0.06	-0.09	0.36	0.00	-0.02
Alesina Ethnic	-0.46	-0.35	0.06	-0.45	-0.17	-0.28	-0.12	-0.29	0.13	0.16	-0.13
Alesina Linguistic	-0.28	-0.26	0.07	-0.32	-0.32	-0.13	0.20	-0.22	-0.07	0.09	-0.18
Alesina Religious	-0.58	-0.24	0.22	-0.34	-0.23	0.00	0.37	-0.16	-0.03	0.18	-0.10

Table 4. Correlation of Alesina and Fearon's Fractionalization

Country	Fractionalization			Annual Cost (M)	Population (M)	Per Capita Cost	Analysis Start Year	Intervention Year	Independence	Years since Independence
	Ethnic	Linguistic	Religious							
El Salvador	0.20	0.00	0.36	30.39	6.88	4.42	1978	1989	1821	168
Guatemala	0.51	0.46	0.38	9.78	12.60	0.78	1978	1989	1821	168
Honduras	0.19	0.06	0.24	5.91	7.21	0.82	1978	1989	1821	168
Nicaragua	0.48	0.05	0.43	5.91	5.49	1.08	1978	1989	1821	168
Angola	0.79	0.79	0.63	206.12	15.94	12.93	1980	1991	1975	16
Cambodia	0.21	0.21	0.10	606.17	14.07	43.08	1980	1991	1953	38
Mozambique	0.69	0.81	0.68	174.46	19.79	8.81	1981	1992	1975	17
Somalia	0.81	0.03	0.00	603.75	8.23	73.38	1981	1992	1960	32
Haiti	0.10	0.00	0.47	133.37	8.53	15.64	1982	1993	1804	189
Liberia	0.91	0.90	0.49	21.71	3.28	6.61	1982	1993	1847	146
Rwanda	0.32	0.00	0.51	118.76	9.04	13.14	1982	1993	1962	31
Chad	0.86	0.86	0.64	129.73	9.75	13.31	1983	1994	1960	34
Central African Republic	0.83	0.83	0.79	164.27	4.04	40.68	1987	1998	1960	38
Sierra Leone	0.82	0.76	0.54	423.80	5.53	76.71	1987	1998	1961	37
Congo Kinshasa	0.87	0.69	0.66	125.48	57.55	2.18	1988	1999	1960	39
Average	0.57	0.43	0.46	183.97	12.53	20.90				

Table 5. Country and Intervention Data

## Bibliography

- Alesino, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic Growth* 8, (2003): 155-194.
- Cornell, Stephen, and Joseph P. Kalt. "Where Does Economic Growth Really Come From: Constitutional Rule Among the Contemporary Sioux and Apache." *Economic Inquiry* 33, no.3: 402-426.
- DiPrizio, Robert. "Weak and Failing States." Air Command and Staff College AY 15 Course Reading, Maxwell AFB, AL.
- Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006.
- Joint Publication 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 2014.
- Kisangani, Emizet F., and Jeffrey Pickering. 2008. "International Military Intervention, 1989-2005." Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Data Collection No 21282, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
- Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers. "Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013." Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) Program Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) University of Maryland, 2014.
- Mazaar, Michael J. "Rise and Fall of the Failed State Paradigm." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2014).
- Obama, Barack H. *National Security Strategy*. Washington D.C.: The White House, 2010.
- Osinga, Frans. "The Enemy as a Complex Adaptive System." In *Airpower as Strategy: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd*, edited by John Andreas Olsen. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015.
- Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, December 2003.
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. *UN Peacekeeping Operations Background Note*. United Nations Department of Public Information – DPI/2429/Rev. 18, April 2014.
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. *Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, January 2010.

**United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 66/163 Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in Enhancing Periodic and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of Democratization. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, April 2012.**

**Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*. New York: Basic Books, 1977.**

